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Race and Bankruptcy: Explaining Racial
Disparities in Consumer Bankruptcy
Edward R. Morrison    Columbia University
Belisa Pang    Yale University
Antoine Uettwiller    Imperial College London
Abstract
African American bankruptcy filers select Chapter 13 far more often than other
debtors, who opt instead for Chapter 7, which has higher success rates and lower
attorneys’ fees. Prior scholarship blames racial discrimination by attorneys. We
propose an alternative explanation: Chapter 13 offers benefits, including retention of cars and driver’s licenses, that are more valuable to African American
debtors because of relatively long commutes. We study a 2011 policy change
in Chicago, which seized cars and suspended licenses of consumers with large
traffic-related debts. The policy produced a large increase in Chapter 13 filings,
especially by African Americans. Two mechanisms explain the disparate racial
impact: African Americans were more likely to have traffic debts and incurred
greater costs from car seizures and license suspension due to relatively long
commutes. When we match African Americans to other debtors with similar
commutes, we find no racial difference in Chapter 13 filing propensities.

1. Introduction
Among those who file for bankruptcy, African Americans are substantially more
likely to select Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 when compared with white debtors.
This has been documented in prior scholarship such as Braucher, Cohen, and
Lawless (2012) and has been the subject of media coverage in the New York Times
(Bernard 2012; also see Kiel 2017) and ProPublica Illinois (Sanchez and Kambhampati 2018). This apparent racial sorting into Chapter 13 is worrisome beWe are grateful to the Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern District of Illinois, Northern District of Georgia, and Middle District of Tennessee and to the City of Chicago for providing data for
this project. We thank the editor and referee, Matthew Bruckner, Anthony Casey, Alexander Evans, Arpit Gupta, Thomas (Zach) Horton, Olatunde Johnson, Angela Littwin, Anup Malani, Justin
McCrary, Joshua Mitts, Eric Talley, and workshop participants at Columbia University, the University of California Hastings College of the Law, the University of Southern California, Washington
University in St. Louis, the 2019 American Law and Economics Association meeting, and the 2018
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies for helpful comments.
[  Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 63 (May 2020)]
© 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/2020/6302-0009$10.00
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cause a Chapter 13 filing is substantially more costly, more time consuming, and
less likely to discharge debts than a Chapter 7 filing, as we have discussed elsewhere (Morrison and Uettwiller 2017). Attorneys’ fees are more than twice as
expensive ($2,600 instead of $1,000), payments to unsecured creditors are substantially larger (because some Chapter 13 trustees demand minimum recoveries
to the creditors), a Chapter 13 plan takes 3 to 5 years to complete (Chapter 7 cases
complete within about 4 months), and around two-thirds of Chapter 13 cases terminate without a discharge of debts (this happens in less than 4 percent of Chapter 7 cases). A commonly cited reason for using Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7
is to shelter assets that would otherwise be liquidated in Chapter 7. Chapter 13
allows a consumer to discharge debt by giving up future income (all disposable
income earned over a 3–5-year period); Chapter 7 allows the consumer to discharge debt by giving up assets, such as cars and houses. Chapter 13 is, therefore,
often described as a device for “saving your home,” as argued by White and Zhu
(2010). Yet this commonly cited explanation for preferring Chapter 13 seems implausible for the vast majority of filings by African Americans, most of whom
have few or no assets vulnerable to liquidation in Chapter 7. A more plausible
explanation for these patterns is racial discrimination by bankruptcy attorneys,
who may be more likely to steer African Americans into Chapter 13 than their
white counterparts. Braucher, Cohen, and Lawless (2012) present experimental
evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
This paper tests an alternative hypothesis: In some areas of the United States,
financially distressed African Americans are more likely to benefit from Chapter
13 than other consumers. A Chapter 13 filing not only allows consumers to retain
assets but also forces the return of assets that have been seized. These assets include physical property, such as cars and homes, and government permits, such
as driver’s licenses. These benefits are generally unavailable in Chapter 7, as discussed in detail in Section 2. The benefits of Chapter 13 could be more valuable
to African Americans than to other debtors for at least two reasons: First, African
Americans may be more likely to accumulate and default on debts that entitle
creditors to seize assets that cannot be sheltered in Chapter 7. Second, African
Americans may face higher costs of asset seizure. Using data from Chicago and
supporting evidence from other major cities, we show in this paper that both reasons are important determinants of Chapter 13 filing decisions by African Americans and explain much of the difference in filing rates between African Americans and other debtors.
We study a natural experiment in Chicago. When Rahm Emanuel took office
as mayor in 2011, he announced a policy that increased city enforcement of outstanding traffic and parking debts. Chicago identified drivers with large accumulated debts and commenced proceedings to seize their vehicles and suspend
their licenses. The Emanuel policy had a much larger effect in African American
neighborhoods than other areas. The city identified substantially more drivers
(per capita) with large accumulated debts and issued substantially more license
suspension notices (per capita) in predominantly African American zip codes
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than in other zip codes. This caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings throughout the city, with a much larger increase among African Americans, even though
Chapter 7 filings were declining. Indeed, Chicago-area attorneys specifically advertised Chapter 13 as a solution for consumers facing license suspensions and
vehicle seizures due to unpaid traffic debts.1 Among consumers who filed for
bankruptcy, the probability of choosing Chapter 13 (instead of Chapter 7) increased across all races, but the increase was 10 percentage points larger among
African Americans. Among car-owning consumers who chose Chapter 13, the
share of filings by African Americans had been declining prior to the Emanuel
policy. After the policy was rolled out, the African American share reversed trend
and increased from 42 percent in 2011 to 55 percent in 2015.
These findings show that African Americans were more likely to accumulate
city debt, were more likely to be targeted by city enforcement efforts, and consequently were more likely to file Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases in response to the
Emanuel policy compared with consumers from other racial groups. The Emanuel policy thus produced a racial disparity that has been attributed to steering by
bankruptcy attorneys. We find additional evidence indicating that African Americans experienced higher costs, on average, from vehicle seizure and license suspension. When we control for the number of license suspensions per zip code,
for example, we continue to find a larger increase in Chapter 13 filings in African
American zip codes, which indicates a greater sensitivity to license suspensions.
Consistent with this interpretation, the post-Emanuel-policy increase in Chapter
13 filings is largest in African American zip codes with relatively long commutes
to work (defined by the percentage of residents commuting more than 45 minutes). By contrast, in zip codes with short commutes, we see little or no difference
between African American and non–African American zip codes. These findings
suggest that the differential response to the Emanuel policy—with African Americans filing Chapter 13 cases at higher rates than other consumers—is attributable in part to differences in the value of retaining automobiles. On average, African Americans may have longer commutes to work and live in areas that are
farther from schools, medical services, and supermarkets. We test this hypothesis
by matching African American bankruptcy filers to non–African American filers
on the basis of consumer characteristics, including estimated distance to work
and debt to the City of Chicago. Within this matched sample, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that there are no racial differences in the probability of choosing Chapter 13 after the Emanuel policy was implemented.
We conclude that observed racial disparities in bankruptcy are attributable, in
1
Websites for leading Chicago-area firms included such statements as “Stop Chicago Tickets.
Eliminate All Penalties & Fees. Get Your License Back. The state will suspend your driver’s license
for unpaid Chicago parking tickets. A DebtStoppers bankruptcy plan can wipe out all parking ticket
debt and get your license re-instated immediately” (DebtStoppers.com, Stop Believing Debt Is “Normal” [https://web.archive.org/web/20140208010235/https://www.debtstoppers.com/]); “Chapter 13
Can Be the Solution (1 Payment) . . . Lawsuits & License Suspension & Parking Tickets” (Law Offices of Peter Francis Geraci, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy [https://web.archive.org/web/20111205044445/
http://www.infotapes.com/webB/Chapter13.htm]); see also Siegel (2013).
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large part, to underlying differences in the background characteristics (especially
commuting times) of African American and other consumers. African Americans are more likely, on average, to experience debt enforcement actions, including seizure of a car or driver’s license. African Americans are also more likely, on
average, to need that car or license for commuting to work.
We explore alternative explanations for our findings, including the possibility that the postpolicy increase in Chapter 13 filings is attributable to liquidity
constraints faced by African American consumers, not to a desire to recover
seized vehicles or suspended driver’s licenses. Bankruptcy attorneys’ fees generally must be paid up front when a consumer files for Chapter 7 but can be paid
in installments during a Chapter 13 case. When Chicago identified drivers with
large outstanding debts and commenced collection efforts, drivers may have
preferred Chapter 13 because it has lower up-front costs. We show that liquidity constraints cannot explain the post-Emanuel-policy increase in Chapter 13
filings among African Americans. First, our regressions include individual-level
controls that account for available liquidity (such as monthly income, assets, and
secured debt). More importantly, we study the response to the Emanuel policy
among consumers who were represented by a pro bono law firm that charges no
legal fees, the Legal Assistance Foundation (LAF). We find a sharp post-Emanuel-
policy increase in both the number and the proportion of Chapter 13 filings at
the LAF. We view this as strong evidence that liquidity constraints, although important to the filing decision generally, are not driving our findings. Instead, the
post-Emanuel-policy increase is more plausibly driven by consumers’ efforts to
recover vehicles and licenses. Consistent with this conclusion is evidence that,
regardless of race, we see a sharp post-Emanuel-policy increase in the proportion
of Chapter 13 cases in which the debtor was cited for driving without a license
during the 12 months preceding the bankruptcy filing.
Our findings indicate that discrimination by attorneys is, at most, a partial
cause of observed racial disparities in bankruptcy. In our data, we observe the
same racial disparities observed in prior work. However, when we include controls for the consumer’s zip code (reflecting driving distance) and debt to the City
of Chicago, the racial disparity shrinks by 50 percent. When we include attorney
fixed effects, which account for the fact that some attorneys steer all clients to
Chapter 13 regardless of race, the racial disparity becomes less than a tenth of its
original size (with at most a 2-percentage-point difference in the probability of
choosing Chapter 13 over Chapter 7).
Although this paper is motivated by racial disparities in consumer bankruptcy,
it has implications for the design of bankruptcy law and public finance. First, our
findings indicate that, although we see racial disparities in bankruptcy, Chapter
13 is used as theory predicts: debtors—particularly the working poor—use it to
retain assets for which the costs of ownership (through a Chapter 13 repayment
plan) are lower than the costs of substitutes (such as renting comparable assets)
and that would be lost in Chapter 7, as discussed in Li and Sarte (2006) and White
and Zhu (2010). In response to the Emanuel policy, debtors filed Chapter 13
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cases to recover their cars and licenses because there are inadequate substitutes
for debtors with long commutes and limited access to alternative modes of transportation, and those assets are difficult or impossible to recover through Chapter
7. The racial disparity is driven primarily by nonbankruptcy policies (such as the
City of Chicago’s ticket enforcement), not by attorney discrimination. Second,
our findings indicate that the Emanuel policy triggered an increase in Chapter 13
filings, especially by African Americans, because the Bankruptcy Code permits
the discharge of fees and fines only in Chapter 13, not in Chapter 7; the city’s lax
enforcement policy allowed residents to accumulate debts that could not be managed without a bankruptcy filing; and there is no statute of limitations applicable
to fines arising from traffic debts. Reforms along any one of these dimensions
would have a substantial effect on the propensity to file for Chapter 13.
Our paper contributes to the literature on racial discrimination in bankruptcy
courts, summarized by the American Bankruptcy Institute (2019). We also contribute to a large literature in sociology and (to a lesser extent) economics that explores the extent to which distance to work or amenities (such as supermarkets)
is greater for the poor, especially African Americans. A persistent theme in this
spatial-mismatch literature is that African American households face substantial disadvantages in commuting to work, as discussed in O’Regan and Quigley
(1999) and Kneebone and Holmes (2015).2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on bankruptcy law and prior research on the relationship between commuting distance
and race. We also describe the natural experiment presented by the Emanuel policy. Section 3 presents our data and summary statistics. We present our results in
Section 4. The concluding Sections 5 and 6 assess the implications of our findings
for the attorney-steering hypothesis and for policy more generally.
2. Background: Bankruptcy Law and Chicago Policy
2.1. Bankruptcy Law
The US Bankruptcy Code offers two primary options for distressed consumers
seeking to discharge their debts. One is Chapter 7, which offers the consumer a
discharge of most debts if she agrees to liquidate nonexempt assets and distribute the proceeds to creditors. Every state exempts certain assets, which the consumer can keep even after debts are discharged. In Illinois, for example, an unmarried consumer can exempt up to $15,000 of home equity, $2,400 of the value
of a motor vehicle, and $4,000 of any personal property (exemption limits double for married couples who file a joint bankruptcy petition). The latter amount
can be applied to the motor vehicle, which allows the consumer to exempt up to
$6,400 of the vehicle’s value. Thus, if the consumer owns a car that is worth less
than $6,400 (the exemption limit), and there is no lien on the car, the consumer
2
For example, Andersson et al. (2018) find that a recently unemployed consumer is more likely
to find new employment if she lives closer to available jobs, and the effect is substantially larger for
African Americans and those living in high-poverty areas.
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can keep the vehicle even after her debts are discharged in Chapter 7. If the car is
worth more than the exemption limit, it is sold and the exempt value is distributed to the consumer. If the car has a lien on it, it is sold, the proceeds are paid to
the secured creditor, and any excess is paid to the consumer, up to the exemption
limit.
The other option for a distressed consumer is Chapter 13, which offers a discharge if she distributes all of her disposable income to creditors for 3–5 years
(3 years if she has sufficiently low income). The Chapter 13 discharge is broader
than the one offered by Chapter 7. For example, Chapter 13 discharges civil fines,
such as traffic and parking debts, something not possible in Chapter 7. A consumer who files for Chapter 13 can also retain all of her assets. If a creditor (including a government agency) has seized an asset, the consumer can demand its
return in most states.3 Although all assets—exempt or nonexempt—are retained,
it still matters whether the assets are exempt. The value of nonexempt assets determines, in part, the minimum payoff that the consumer must distribute to creditors during the repayment period.4
The principal advantage of Chapter 13 is, therefore, the ability to retain assets.
Prior scholarship, such as White and Zhu (2010), focuses on the ability to retain
a home, but retaining a vehicle may be just as important. In addition, a consumer
can retain nonconventional property such as a driver’s license if it was seized on
account of unpaid debts. Thus, for a car owner, Chapter 13 has three distinct advantages relative to Chapter 7: retention of the vehicle, recovery of a suspended
license, and discharge of debts arising from parking and traffic fines.5
The principal disadvantages of Chapter 13 are its cost and success rate. Relative to Chapter 7, it is substantially more expensive (Morrison and Uettwiller
2017). Attorneys’ fees average about $1,000 in Chapter 7 but $2,600 in Chapter
13 (with a very large standard deviation). In addition, consumers often must pay
substantially more to creditors (over the course of a 3–5-year repayment period)
in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 7. Although it costs more than Chapter 7, Chapter
3
There is some disagreement among courts whether the government must return an impounded
vehicle. The majority of courts that have considered the question, though, hold that the government
must do so. See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. City of Chicago v.
Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 680 (December 18, 2019).
4
In practice, however, this minimum-payoff floor is unlikely to be binding because of the requirement that the consumer pay all of her disposable income. Elsewhere, we provide more background
on Chapter 13 and the ways it differs from Chapter 7 (Morrison and Uettwiller 2017) .
5
Technically, it may be possible to recover a suspended driver’s license by filing for Chapter 7,
which would discharge other debts, thereby freeing up cash to pay parking and traffic fines. This
strategy would be feasible only for debtors with sufficient cash flow to pay the fines. Because the average debt owed to the City of Chicago is over $1,000 among Chapter 13 filers and about 40 percent
of these filers have income below 150 percent of the poverty line, this strategy seems infeasible for
a large proportion of Chapter 13 filers. To be sure, given much higher attorneys’ fees in a Chapter
13 case, this strategy would be attractive if the City of Chicago offered sufficiently generous repayment plans allowing consumers to pay debts slowly over time. In 2019, under Mayor Lori Lightfoot,
the city introduced new repayment plans and announced that it had “stopped suspending driver’s
licenses where the violations involved are non-driving violations such as parking tickets, city sticker
tickets, or license plate expiration tickets” (City of Chicago, Suspended License, Booting, Ticketing and Towing Reforms [https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/sites/newstartchicago/home/suspended
-license--booting--ticketing-and-towing-reforms.html]).
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13 is less likely to yield a discharge of debt. A debtor fails to receive a discharge
in two-thirds of Chapter 13 cases but in less than 3 percent of Chapter 7 cases, as
discussed in Greene, Patel, and Porter (2017). For a car owner, then, Chapter 13
is a high-cost bankruptcy option with a low expected success rate.
2.2. The Chicago Policy
Rahm Emanuel became Chicago’s mayor in May 2011. In October of that year,
he issued a press release announcing that “his administration will implement a
new aggressive approach to improve collections owed to the city, including millions of dollars in unpaid parking tickets, unpaid fees, fines and penalties. The reforms are anticipated to bring in up to an additional $33 million in collections in
2012” (City of Chicago 2011). The press release explains that, in the past, billing
and collection were fragmented across several city departments. The new policy
would, among other things, “improve collections by consolidating debt types for
individuals who owe for more than one type. [The mayor] will also call for contracted collection agencies to increase rates to recover $5 million in debts. For
example, there is one Chicagoan who owes $87,000 in parking tickets on four different license plates that go back to 2005, $70,000 on one plate alone. This case is
now in the hands of a city law firm” (City of Chicago 2011).
The process for enforcing parking and traffic debt in Chicago has several stages
(as described by City of Chicago 2018).6 A driver first receives a notice of violation after the city detects a parking or traffic violation. If the driver does not contest the violation within 21 days, she receives a notice of determination, which
represents a debt to the city. The debt must be paid by a specified deadline; if it
is not, the debt is doubled and the driver is sent a notice of final determination,
which may add fines and penalties to the original debt. When a driver accumulates three or more final determinations (or if two determinations are at least a
year old), the city sends a notice of seizure, which alerts the driver that the city
will boot and impound her car if she does not pay the debt within 21 days. The
car is impounded by the city until it receives payment of the outstanding debt,
plus towing and daily storage fees. If the vehicle is not redeemed within 15 days,
the city can sell or destroy it. When a driver accumulates final determinations for
at least 10 parking tickets or five automated-camera violations, the city sends a
notice of impending driver’s license suspension (DLS). If the driver does not pay
outstanding debts, the city alerts the State of Illinois that it should suspend the
driver’s license. The license remains suspended until the city alerts the state that
the outstanding debt has been paid.
There are, therefore, two principal tools by which the city enforces parking and
traffic debt: vehicle seizures and license suspensions. Through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, we obtained zip-code-level data on total parking
and traffic debt, number of seizure notices, and number of DLS notices. A single
6
In 2019, the city announced modifications to these stages. See City of Chicago, Suspended License,
Booting, Ticketing and Towing Reforms (https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/sites/newstartchicago/
home/suspended-license--booting--ticketing-and-towing-reforms.html).
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Figure 1. Chicago enforcement policy, 2008–15

driver can (and often does) receive multiple notices. Because our data count all
notices, not just the first notice, it measures the intensity with which Chicago
communicated the threat of vehicle seizure or DLS.7 Figure 1 plots our FOIA data
by year. There is a sharp change in trend for DLS notices, which had been declining prior to 2011. The seizure trend remains relatively flat. It appears, then, that
the city’s policy primarily operated along the dimension of license suspensions.
The trend in DLS notices is mirrored in total debt in Figure 1, which shows a
sharp increase after 2011. As we show in the Online Appendix, it appears that,
beginning in 2011, the city began collecting long-overdue debts (especially tickets
issued more than 7 years earlier) and increased ticket prices (see Figure OA7).8
3. Data
Our primary data set includes information about consumer bankruptcy filings
in Chicago from 2008 through 2016. We link two data sources. One is the Federal
Judicial Center Integrated Database (IDB), which includes information about
the consumer’s address (zip code), capital structure (values of real and personal
property and secured and unsecured debt), and case characteristics, such as filing date and outcome. The other data source is the Case Management/Electronic
7
For example, a driver receives additional driver’s license suspension (DLS) notices after the first
notice if she incurs new tickets or fines. The city renotifies the driver that her license is subject to
impending suspension. We reran the analysis using data that count only the first DLS notice. We
find comparable results, as Figure OA1 of the Online Appendix shows. Figure OA1 shows a spike in
first-time DLS notices during 2013, which is studied in Kessler (2020). This spike is less apparent in
Figure 1, where we plot the total number of notices, not just first-time notices. This suggests that the
Emanuel policy not only increased license suspensions but also increased the number of additional
notices. The increase in additional notices is so large that it obscures the spike during 2013.
8
Figure OA7 uses ticket-level data obtained by ProPublica via a Freedom of Information Act request. The data are publicly available; see ProPublica Data Store, City of Chicago Parking and Camera Ticket Data (https://www.propublica.org/datastore/dataset/chicago-parking-ticket-data).
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Case Files Document Filing System for the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, which encompasses Cook County and nearby counties. We
downloaded and scraped every petition for every Chapter 7 and 13 case filed
from 2008 through 2016. For Chapter 13 cases, we also scraped the docket sheets,
proofs of claim filed by the City of Chicago, Bankruptcy Noticing Center certificates of notice (providing a list of creditors), and proposed repayment plans. Using these data, we can identify the name and address of each debtor, the debtor’s
occupation and work address, whether any debt was owed to the City of Chicago,
and whether the city took steps to seize the debtor’s car or suspend her license.
We link these bankruptcy data to several data sets, including monthly zipcode-level data on traffic and parking enforcement in Chicago, census data on
racial composition and commuting times by census tract and zip-code tabulation
area, and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) data on food deserts, defined as
census tracts in which at least a third of the tract’s population resides more than a
half mile from a supermarket or large grocery store.9
Finally, we impute the race of bankruptcy filers on the basis of their names and
addresses. Data on race by surname is available from the 2000 census; race by first
name is available from an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency database,
drawn from mortgage applications and assembled by Tzioumis (2018); race by
census tract is available from the 2010 census. We combine these sources, applying the same algorithm recommended by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (2014), to estimate the probability that a person in our data is African
American. We identify a person as African American if our algorithm predicts a
probability greater than 70 percent (our results do not change if we use a higher
cutoff).10
Table 1 summarizes our data, showing that Chapter 13 filings account for
about a third of cases. African Americans account for about 40 percent of Chapter 13 filings but less than 20 percent of Chapter 7 filings. Relative to Chapter 7
filers, Chapter 13 debtors have higher incomes, are more likely to own cars, and
are more likely to have secured debt.
We begin by documenting the correlation between distance, race, and bankruptcy in Chicago. Table 2 stratifies zip codes by distance from work and supermarkets. Distant from work is defined as the percentage of zip-code residents
who travel more than 45 minutes to work. Distant from supermarkets (food desert) is defined as the percentage of residents who live at least 1 mile from a supermarket. We rank zip codes by the percentage of residents who either travel at
least 45 minutes to work or live in a food desert. Table 2 reports means for each
quintile of this distance ranking.
Chapter 13’s share of bankruptcy filings increases nearly monotonically as we
move from the first to fifth quintile, consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter
9
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides an alternate definition, identifying tracts in
which over a third of the population resides more than a mile from a supermarket or large grocery
store. These definitions apply only to nonrural tracts. For rural tracts, which are not relevant to this
paper, the FDA uses a longer travel time (for example, 10 miles) to identify food deserts.
10
Our results are similar, but weaker and less precisely estimated, when we impute race solely on
the basis of first and last name.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Mean
Chapter 13 cases (N = 154,620):
% African American
Assets ($)
Debt ($)
Secured debt (among those with this debt) ($)
% Real estate owner
% Car owner
% With secured debt
Monthly income ($)
Monthly expenses ($)
% Below 200% of the poverty line
Chapter 7 cases (N = 286,666):
% African American
Assets ($)
Debt ($)
Secured debt (among those with this debt) ($)
% Real estate owner
% Car owner
% With secured debt
Monthly income ($)
Monthly expenses ($)
% Below 200% of the poverty line

40.51
107,214
150,654
134,442
44.44
82.74
80.80
3,605
2,892
37.92
17.93
108,136
209,036
177,894
45.17
75.39
68.30
2,809
3,210
50.07

SD

459,858
899,061
982,443

14,421
4,488

233,903
5,569,225
286,662

6,937
59,066

13 tends to be more attractive to financially distressed consumers when they live
in places where cars are likely an important means of accessing work and amenities. Table 2 also shows that African Americans are much more likely to live
in zip codes with high distance rankings. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that African Americans are more likely to live in zip codes where cars are likely
an important means of transportation and, as a result, are more likely to file for
Chapter 13 when they become financially distressed. This phenomenon—the correlation of distance, race, and Chapter 13 filing rates—can be observed in other
cities, such as Atlanta and Memphis, which have been the focus of academic and
media reports because African Americans account for a disproportionate share
of Chapter 13 filings relative to Chapter 7 in these cities. This is illustrated by
Tables OA4 and OA5 in the Online Appendix.
4. Evidence from the Policy Change
We hypothesize that African American bankruptcy filers are, on average, more
likely to file a Chapter 13 petition than other debtors because they are more likely
to accumulate and default on debts that permit creditors to seize assets that cannot be sheltered in Chapter 7 and because they face higher costs from seizure of
those assets. We test these hypotheses using the Emanuel policy, which triggered
a sudden increase in DLS notices, as shown in Figure 1. Although the process
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Table 2
Commuting Distance and Bankruptcy Filing Rates
Distance
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5

% Distant or
in Food
Desert
% Distant
11.86
(2.57)
23.31
(3.24)
38.90
(5.96)
60.62
(6.81)
86.60
(10.30)

11.76
(2.61)
21.46
(5.47)
26.94
(7.91)
22.56
(10.40)
23.89
(9.32)

% in Food
Desert
.12
(.66)
2.10
(5.15)
15.14
(12.44)
48.06
(10.99)
81.85
(14.22)

Chapter 13
% African % Chapter Filings per
American
13
Thousand
.64
(1.65)
7.98
(19.03)
13.10
(20.57)
26.78
(32.99)
39.06
(35.56)

12.04
(8.21)
17.88
(10.17)
24.61
(11.14)
28.39
(14.45)
32.72
(15.85)

.40
(.35)
1.08
(1.38)
1.53
(1.23)
2.47
(2.29)
3.19
(2.68)

Median
Income
52.61
(5.24)
54.69
(5.77)
49.27
(9.53)
47.87
(10.37)
40.88
(9.04)

Note. The distance measure is a commute to work of more than 45 minutes. N = 212.

for suspending a license is mechanical, as described in Section 2, the policy had
a much larger impact on African American drivers. This is shown in Figure 2,
which plots debt owed to the City of Chicago and DLS notices per capita for zip
codes in Cook County. A zip code is deemed predominantly African American if
African Americans account for at least 50 percent of its population; the remaining zip codes are defined as “other.” Figure 2 shows that, among African American zip codes, per capita DLS notices roughly tripled after the Emanuel policy
commenced in 2011. The increase is smaller (but still substantial) in other zip
codes: DLS notices roughly doubled during the years following the Emanuel policy.11
We view the Emanuel policy as a shock to the probability that drivers, especially African Americans, would have their licenses suspended by the city government. Licenses are assets that can be protected through a Chapter 13 filing (and
can be recovered, if already seized) but not through Chapter 7. We hypothesize
that the policy caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings by African Americans
relative to other races. We also hypothesize that DLS notices were more costly,
on average, for African Americans than other drivers because African Americans
rely more heavily on cars for commuting.12
11
We observe a comparable pattern when we count only the number of first DLS notices per capita, as Figure OA2 in the Online Appendix shows.
12
Although we focus on DLS notices, we cannot rule out the possibility that they are correlated
with other enforcement decisions, such as ticketing and vehicle seizures, that may vary by race and
induce greater demand for Chapter 13 among African Americans than other drivers. Whether the
rise in total DLS notices documented here is indicative of an increase in license suspensions, v ehicle
seizures, or ticketing that would lead to suspension or seizure, the effect on drivers is the same:
they become at risk for losing assets (cars, licenses) that are needed for commuting. Our hypothesis is that, whatever the mechanism, the Emanuel policy imposed relatively higher costs on African
Americans relative to other races and that these higher costs explain the increase in Chapter 13 filings among African Americans relative to other drivers after Emanuel took office.
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Figure 2. Traffic debt and license suspensions per capita

4.1. Racial Differences in the Effect of the Emanuel Policy on Bankruptcy Filings
Figure 3 plots total bankruptcy filings by race. Figure 3A compares African
Americans and non–African American filers; Figure 3B compares African Americans with white filers. The data underlying Figure 3 are drawn from individual-
level bankruptcy files. Before the Emanuel policy was announced in 2011, total
Chapter 13 filings by African Americans were nearly identical to filings by white
debtors. After 2011, we see a divergence, with an increase in African American
Chapter 13 filings in absolute terms and relative to others. A very different pattern characterizes Chapter 7 filings, which declined across all races beginning in
2010, with a much sharper decline among non–African American debtors. This
decline predates the Emanuel policy and likely reflects the end of the recession; a
similar decline in Chapter 7 filings is observed throughout the country.
If the Emanuel policy caused an increase in Chapter 13 filings, especially
among African Americans, we should also observe that, among bankruptcy filers,
the propensity to select Chapter 13 should increase for all races after the policy
went into effect, and this increase should be larger for African Americans. We
test this hypothesis using a standard event-study difference-in-difference regression, following Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach (2011) and Autor (2003):
Bit = α +
(1)

+

2010

∑µ

k =2008
2016

∑µ

k =2012

k

k

× African Americani × 1[t = k]

× African Americani × 1[t = k]

+ African Americani + qt + X it + εit ,

(1)
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Figure 3. Total bankruptcy filings by race

where Bit is equal to one if consumer i filed a Chapter 13 petition in calendar year
t and equal to zero if she filed for Chapter 7. The variable African Americani is
equal to one if the consumer is African American, θt is a vector of calendar-year
fixed effects, and matrix Xit includes a variety of controls, including the (log) value
of personal property, real property, total debt, secured debt, and monthly income
and expenses.13 The coefficient of interest is μk, which measures the change in
the probability of a Chapter 13 filing among African Americans relative to other
debtors, and we calculate it during the calendar years prior to and following 2011,
when the Emanuel policy was rolled out. Standard errors are clustered by zip
code. The identifying assumption in our model is that, conditional on observables, the timing of the choice between Chapters 7 and 13 is unrelated to the individual’s race, up to a constant difference. By interacting African Americani with
13

We avoid zeroes by using the log of the variable plus $1.
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year fixed effects both before and after the policy was rolled out, we can assess
whether prepolicy trends are (in)consistent with our identifying assumption.14
Figure 4 presents the values for μk from this model (the baseline estimates in
Table 3). We observe a sudden jump upward, immediately after implementation of the Emanuel policy, in the relative probability that an African American
debtor selects Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. By 2013, African American bankruptcy filers were 5 percentage points more likely to choose Chapter 13, relative
to other debtors.15 The pre-2011 interactions between African American and calendar year show little or no evidence of a prepolicy trend: the difference between
African American and other debtors is small, negative, and generally insignificant. We conclude that the Emanuel policy caused an increase in Chapter 13 filing rates, especially among African Americans.16
4.2. Mechanisms: Race and Distance
Prior work has argued that racial discrimination by attorneys explains the
higher propensity of African American debtors, relative to others, to file for
Chapter 13. Another plausible hypothesis is that the higher propensity is caused
by differences in background characteristics of African American and other debtors. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis appears in Figure 5, which plots the
ratio of Chapter 13 filings during a given quarter to DLS notices during the preceding two quarters by zip code. We view this ratio as a measure of the Chapter
13 take-up rate among consumers who received DLS notices. Prior to the Emanuel policy, the ratio was virtually identical for African Americans and others. After the policy was implemented, we see a divergence in the ratio, with DLS notices
translating into Chapter 13 filings at a higher rate for African Americans than
others. This pattern suggests that license suspensions could be more costly to African Americans, on average, inducing them to file for Chapter 13 at a higher rate
than others.17
One reason why license suspensions could be more costly for African Ameri14
Although we do not have individual-level data for jurisdictions outside the Northern District of
Illinois, we can run tract-level analysis comparing outcomes in Chicago tracts with matched tracts
outside Chicago. We run that analysis in Section OA2 of the Online Appendix and obtain results
comparable to those reported in the main text.
15
The μk coefficients appear to decline in 2015 and 2016, which may reflect a slowdown in enforcement. Figure 2 shows that DLS enforcement decelerated among African Americans around
2015.
16
Online Appendix Table OA1 shows that the Emanuel policy caused a shift in the composition
of debtors filing for Chapter 13. It presents means for debtors who filed Chapter 13 petitions during
the 3 years before the Emanuel policy began (2008–10) and for debtors who filed for Chapter 13
during the 3 years after (2012–14). The results for all cases show that, after the Emanuel policy,
Chapter 13 filers were more likely to be African American, be unmarried, have income below 200
percent of the poverty line, not own a home, and owe debt to the City of Chicago. Although there
is no change in the proportion of filers who own a car, there is a sharp increase in the proportion of
filers who own a car but not a home. Among individuals who own a car but not a home, the majority
of filers are African American during the post-Emanuel-policy period.
17
We observe comparable patterns when we count only the number of initial DLS notices, as Online Appendix Figure OA3 shows.

Figure 4. Event-study difference-in-difference estimates

Table 3
Effect of the Emanuel Policy on Share of Chapter 13 Filings
Baseline
African American × 2008
African American × 2009
African American × 2010
African American × 2011
African American × 2012
African American × 2013
African American × 2014
African American × 2015
African American × 2016
N

−.019*
(.044)
−.0096
(.289)
−.0059
(.331)

Long
Commute
−.012
(.318)
−.010
(.371)
.00042
(.968)

Short
Commute
−.015
(.688)
.024
(.459)
−.067
(.091)

Matching
−.013
(.223)
−.0037
(.722)
.0014
(.888)

Matching
within Tract
−.00050
(.972)
.0030
(.831)
.0059
(.642)

.038**
.037**
.0072
.022*
.018
(.000)
(.001)
(.848)
(.024)
(.179)
.051**
.042**
.000064
.033**
.0095
(.000)
(.000)
(.999)
(.001)
(.501)
.051**
.050**
.0015
.046**
.0086
(.000)
(.000)
(.976)
(.000)
(.545)
.033**
.035**
−.024
.039**
.012
(.001)
(.002)
(.456)
(.000)
(.350)
.023*
.027*
−.059
.026**
−.0043
(.013)
(.020)
(.142)
(.007)
(.759)
259,390
116,652
31,539
154,225
55,259

Note. All regressions include zip-code fixed effects (first column) or tract fixed effects (other columns), year fixed effects, and case controls.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
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Figure 5. Ratio of Chapter 13 filings to suspension notices by race

cans is that they are more likely to live in geographic areas with longer commutes
to work, supermarkets, schools, and other destinations. To explore this hypothesis, we identify long-commute debtors, who are likely to place relatively high
value on their licenses and cars and therefore incur relatively high costs from license suspension and vehicle seizure. We assume a debtor has a long commute if
she lives in a census tract that is either classified by the FDA as a food desert or in
the top quartile of tracts as measured by percentage of residents who travel more
than 45 minutes to work. Similarly, we define a short-commute debtor as one
who lives in a tract that is not a food desert and is among the bottom 50 percent
of tracts as measured by percentage of residents traveling more than 45 minutes
to work. We estimate equation (1) separately for each subsample. Figure 6 reports the coefficients, which show relatively small and statistically insignificant
effects of the Emanuel policy in short-commute tracts (Figure 6B), indicating that
the policy response among African American debtors is indistinguishable from
the response among other debtors (coefficient estimates are reported in Table 3).
In long-commute tracts (Figure 6A), by contrast, we observe a sharp postpolicy
response among African American debtors relative to other debtors.18 This result
is consistent with the hypothesis that commuting time is an important determinant of Chapter 13 filings, but it is unclear why commuting time matters more
for African Americans than other debtors living in the same tracts. One possibility is that, even within a given tract, African Americans have longer commutes.
We explore this possibility by matching African American debtors to other
debtors who are observationally identical. Our matching algorithm is standard
18
We observe the same pattern—no effect in short-commute tracts and large effects in long-
commute tracts—when we drop food deserts and compare tracts with relatively long and short commutes. We also observe the same pattern when we drop tracts in which one group (African American, Hispanic, or other) accounts for more than one-third of the population.
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Figure 6. Event-study difference-in-difference estimates by commuting time. A, Long-
commute sample; B, short-commute sample.

nearest-neighbor propensity-score matching with common support and no replacement (the procedure is described in more detail in Section OA1 of the Online Appendix). Figure 7 shows the effect of matching; Table 3 reports the coefficients. We begin by reproducing the baseline regression in Figure 7A. Matching
on controls, as we do in Figure 7B, has little effect on the estimates, but matching
on both census tract and observables has a marked effect, as we see in Figure 7C.
Specifically, when African Americans are matched to others who are not only
observationally similar but also live in the same tract, there is a sizable but imprecisely estimated effect in 2012 but no observable effect in subsequent years. We
view this as evidence that although the Emanuel policy had a larger effect on African Americans, the typical African American debtor has substantially different
characteristics—especially geographic location—than the typical non–African

Figure 7. Effect of matching debtors. A, No matching; B, matching on controls; C, matching
on tract and controls.
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American debtor. These differences rendered African Americans more sensitive
to the Emanuel enforcement policy and therefore more likely to file for Chapter
13 bankruptcy, which allows debtors to recover their cars and licenses.19
4.3. Alternative Mechanisms
We have focused on one difference between Chapters 7 and 13 that can generate a preference for Chapter 13 among African Americans: Chapter 13 allows
the debtor to recover seized assets, such as driver’s licenses. Another potentially
important difference is that attorneys’ fees generally must be paid in full before
a debtor files for Chapter 7 but can be paid in installments after a debtor files for
Chapter 13. Liquidity constraints, in other words, can generate a preference for
Chapter 13, as documented by Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014), among
others. Because the Emanuel policy effectively placed thousands of drivers into
default, it increased demand for bankruptcy generally and especially increased
demand for Chapter 13 among liquidity-constrained drivers. Racial differences
in liquidity constraints—not differences in commuting distances—might therefore explain the post-Emanuel-policy increase in Chapter 13 filings among African Americans relative to others.
This mechanism is inconsistent with the estimates reported in Figure 7, which
explicitly control for liquidity by including (log) income, assets, and debt in the
regressions as well as the matching algorithm. Figure 7B, in other words, matches
African American and other debtors on liquidity. We can go further, however,
and explore the role of liquidity using variation in law firms’ pricing. One firm in
our sample, the LAF, served indigent clients and charged no legal fees regardless
of chapter choice. Unsurprisingly, the LAF’s clients were liquidity constrained,
as Figure 8B shows by plotting the median income of cases filed by LAF clients
and by other firms. If liquidity constraints are the primary reason for the postEmanuel-policy rise in Chapter 13 filings, we are unlikely to observe an increase
among LAF clients. Figure 8A plots the number of cases per year for LAF, showing an increase in the total number of Chapter 13 filings immediately after the
Emanuel policy went online. Figure 8C plots the share of Chapter 13 filings, again
showing a sharp post-Emanuel-policy increase. What is most striking here is
that the postpolicy increase is sharpest for the debtors with liquidity constraints;
that is, those represented by the LAF. Consistent with the fact that this pro bono
agency selects debtors who are very poor, regardless of race, Figure 8D shows that
the postpolicy increase is nearly identical for both African Americans and other
debtors. We view these patterns as evidence that liquidity constraints do not fully
19
Our results reflect both responses along the intensive margin (increased demand for Chapter 13
among consumers who would have filed for some type of bankruptcy in the absence of the policy)
and responses along the extensive margin (increased demand for Chapter 13 among consumers who
were unlikely to file for bankruptcy in the absence of the policy). Section OA3 of the Online Appendix attempts to isolate responses along the extensive margin by focusing on consumers who had
little or no reason to file for bankruptcy in the absence of the Emanuel policy.

288

The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS

Figure 8. Law firms’ pricing and liquidity constraints. A, Cases filed by the Legal Assistance
Foundation; B, median debtor income; C, share of Chapter 13 filings; D, Legal Assistance Foundation’s chapter 13 filings by race.

explain the post-Emanuel-policy increase in Chapter 13 filings by African Americans.
4.4. Effect on Total Filings
Our analysis has focused primarily on a compositional change: the Emanuel
policy increased the share of Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings, especially among African Americans. The policy had effects on the level of filings as well. To show
this, we construct a synthetic control group of non-Chicago zip codes, located
anywhere in the United States, that are the nearest-neighbor matches for the
Chicago zip codes in our data. We match Chicago and non-Chicago (control)
zip codes using 2010 census data, including bankruptcy filing rates, the share of
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings, median income, percentage of residents below the
poverty line, and percentage of residents who are African American.20 Figure 9
shows the annual per capita filing rate for Chicago and control zip codes. Figure
9A and B split the zip codes by race, with African American zip codes defined
as those where African Americans account for over half of the population. Figure 9A shows little discernible difference in Chapter 7 filing rates between Chi20

Section OA1 of the Online Appendix describes the matching procedure in detail.
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Table 4
Effect of the Emanuel Policy on Filings: Cases Per Capita

Chicago
After Policy
Chicago × After Policy
Dependent variable mean
N

All Zip
Codes

African American
Zip Codes

Other Zip
Codes

.00081**
(.008)
−.00089**
(.000)
.0010**
(.000)
.00431
1,320

.0024*
(.038)
−.00035
(.172)
.0035**
(.000)
.00914
320

.00057*
(.018)
−.0012**
(.000)
.00053*
(.022)
.00383
1,000

Note. All regressions include zip-code controls.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.

cago and control zip codes during the post-Emanuel-policy period, though African American filings in Chicago decline less sharply than filings in the control
zip codes. Figure 9B, by contrast, shows a large difference in Chapter 13 filings
for both African Americans and others: filing rates in Chicago diverge sharply
from the controls during the post-Emanuel-policy period. Figure 9C shows the
per capita filing rate for all types of bankruptcy, regardless of race. We see that the
postpolicy increase in Chapter 13 filings prevented total filings in Chicago from
declining as sharply as they did in the control zip codes.
We can use a simple difference-in-difference estimator to calculate the extent
to which the Emanuel policy elevated total filings in Chicago relative to the control zip codes. Table 4 shows that, without the Emanuel policy, per capita bankruptcy filings in Chicago would have been .001 lower. Put differently, relative to
the mean per capita filing rate in Chicago (.00431), filings in Chicago would have
been over 20 percent lower in the absence of the Emanuel policy. Among African
Americans, filings would have been over 35 percent lower. To put this into perspective, there were about 17,000 bankruptcy filings in Chicago during 2012. Our
estimates indicate that nearly 4,000 of these filings were caused by the Emanuel
policy.
5. The Relative Importance of Attorney Steering
Our analysis shows that selection effects are an important explanation for racial disparities in consumer bankruptcy because Chapter 13 is attractive to consumers seeking to protect key assets such as cars and driver’s licenses. Because
of geographic disparities, including relatively longer commuting times, African
American bankruptcy filers place a higher value on those assets than filers in
other racial groups and, therefore, are more likely to file a Chapter 13 case.
Our data point to another potential selection effect: Chicago-area attorneys often specialize in one type of bankruptcy case (Chapter 7 or 13), and the attorneys
who favor Chapter 13 are also the attorneys most often used by African American

Figure 9. Effect on filings. A, Chapter 7 filings; B, Chapter 13 filings; C, filings per capita
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debtors. Indeed, two attorneys (Geraci and Semrad) account for nearly 80 percent of Chapter 13 filings by African Americans. To the extent that consumers
select attorneys on the basis of factors that are unrelated to their underlying case
characteristics—such as distance (Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller 2010) or social
networks (Miller 2015)—we may observe racial disparities in Chapter 13 simply
because African Americans select attorneys who favor Chapter 13 and do so regardless of race.
Table 5 explores racial disparities in Chapter 13 filings after accounting for
these potential selection effects. These regressions analyze the subset of Chapter
7 and 13 bankruptcy cases filed by African American and white consumers—the
comparison drawn in prior literature. Pro se filings are excluded because our goal
is to assess how much of the racial disparity in bankruptcy is attributable to law
firms’ behavior. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of a simple regression in
which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the consumer chose
Chapter 13 (and zero if she chose Chapter 7); the only regressor in column 1 is
the consumer’s race, while column 2 adds time fixed effects. Both columns yield
roughly the same coefficient, which shows that African Americans are about 25
percentage points more likely to file a Chapter 13 case relative to non-Hispanic
consumers. This coefficient is consistent with prior literature, such as Braucher,
Cohen, and Lawless (2012, table 2), which finds a 26.1-percentage-point difference between African American and white Chapter 13 filing rates. Column 3 adds
attorney fixed effects, which account for the possibility that some consumers tend
to select attorneys with strong preferences for one style of bankruptcy. This control, by itself, reduces the size of the African American coefficient by over 50 percent. Columns 4 and 5 rerun the analysis on two subsamples: consumers with no
debt owed to the City of Chicago and consumers with such debt. We create these
subsamples to account for the selection effect documented in this paper: Chapter
13 is particularly attractive to consumers who owe debts to the City of Chicago
and are therefore at risk of having their cars seized or licenses suspended. Once
we separate the two subsamples in this way, the coefficient on the African American dummy drops by 50 percent again.
Finally, in columns 6 and 7 we include zip-code fixed effects, which help account for differences in commuting time across zip codes. This control causes
the African American dummy to fall by over 50 percent again. Thus, with the full
battery of controls, the share of Chapter 13 among African American consumers
is only 1 or 2 percentage points higher than among white consumers. Selection
effects might, therefore, be the primary driver of perceived racial disparities in
bankruptcy.
6. Conclusion
It is well understood that Chapter 13 is most valuable to distressed consumers
hoping to retain assets they would lose in Chapter 7 or outside bankruptcy. That
well-understood phenomenon provides an (at least partial) explanation for racial

** P < .01.

Year-quarter fixed effects
Law-firm fixed effects
Zip-code fixed effects
N

African American

.25**
(.000)
No
No
No
213,263

(1)
.24**
(.000)
Yes
No
No
213,263

(2)
.10**
(.000)
Yes
Yes
No
205,103

(3)
.052**
(.000)
Yes
Yes
No
137,540

No Debt
(4)

Table 5
Racial Steering and Selection Effects

.046**
(.000)
Yes
Yes
No
63,607

Debt
(5)

.022**
(.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
137,540

No Debt
(6)

.010**
(.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
63,607

Debt
(7)
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disparities in bankruptcy, as illustrated by Chicago’s policy. As the city increased
the rate at which it seized driver’s licenses and cars, residents increased the rate
at which they filed for Chapter 13, which allows immediate recovery of those assets and permits discharge of city debt, neither of which is possible in Chapter
7. The increase in Chapter 13 filings was largest for African Americans, who are
more likely to incur city debt and who appear to experience larger costs from asset seizure because they have longer commutes to work and amenities. Thus, racial differences in debt burdens and in the costs of debt enforcement help explain
well-documented racial disparities in bankruptcy filings.
Our findings suggest that Chapter 13 plays an important role in allowing the
working poor to retain access to transportation. In this paper, the importance
of Chapter 13 is driven, in part, by a quirk of the bankruptcy code: fines, such as
parking tickets, can be discharged in Chapter 13 but not in Chapter 7. But even
if this rule were eliminated, Chapter 13 would remain important to the working
poor because it permits consumers to retain (and recover) assets that are vulnerable to collection by creditors. For example, a Chapter 13 filing allows a consumer
to retain a vehicle that might otherwise be seized by a lender. Because of the importance of Chapter 13 to the working poor, it is puzzling that the same rules apply to both poor and nonpoor debtors. For example, bankruptcy courts often require debtors to pay a minimum recovery to unsecured creditors (for example, 10
percent of outstanding debt).21 A requirement like this renders Chapter 13 infeasible or unsuccessful for many poor debtors (see Morrison and Uettwiller 2017).
Courts might consider relaxing those rules for the working poor.
Our findings also suggest that, because Chapter 13 may function as the only avenue of relief for the working poor faced with collection efforts that threaten their
transportation options, the poor may have very weak bargaining power when they
seek legal representation. Bankruptcy attorneys, therefore, are able to charge substantial fees for routine cases. Although Cook County is served by a large number
of bankruptcy attorneys, 80 percent of African American debtors are represented
by two law firms, which suggests substantial market power. Those attorneys can
be assured of payment, even though the vast majority of Chapter 13 cases are dismissed before the debtor completes the repayment plan, because attorneys’ fees
are paid first as the debtor submits payments pursuant to the plan. Poor debtors,
therefore, have weak bargaining power, agree to large fees, but typically receive
no discharge because their cases are dismissed. Bankruptcy courts might consider
limiting attorneys’ fees in Chapter 13 cases, which would help mitigate the effects
of the disparity in bargaining power.
Finally, our findings point to the role of nonbankruptcy policies (such as the
City of Chicago’s enforcement policies) in driving racial disparities in bankruptcy. In Chicago, these disparities would attenuate if the city were to reform its
policies for collecting fines. Relative to other large cities such as Los Angeles and
New York, Chicago allows its residents to accumulate large balances before tak21
Technically, this requirement is imposed by Chapter 13 trustees, with court consent; see Morrison and Uettwiller (2017) for a discussion.
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ing steps such as seizing a vehicle or suspending a driver’s license, as discussed in
Sanchez and Kambhampati (2018). Not only is the city slow to collect, but there
is no statute of limitations on parking tickets in Chicago (unlike Los Angeles and
New York, which have 5- and 8-year limitations periods, respectively). Thus, by
the time a driver’s license is suspended, the outstanding balance may be much
larger than a consumer’s ability to pay, which triggers a bankruptcy filing. If the
city were to act more quickly to collect fines, or if parking tickets were subject
to a limitations period, consumers would have smaller balances when collection
efforts commenced and would be more likely to pay those balances (or enter a repayment plan) without a bankruptcy filing.
References
Almond, Douglas, Hilary W. Hoynes, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach. 2011. Inside
the War on Poverty: The Impact of Food Stamps on Birth Outcomes. Review of Economics and Statistics 93:387–403.
American Bankruptcy Institute. 2019. Final Report of the ABI Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy. Alexandria, VA: American Bankruptcy Institute. https://consumer
commission.abi.org/.
Andersson, Fredrik, John C. Haltiwanger, Mark J. Kutzbach, Henry O. Pollakowski, and
Daniel H. Weinberg. 2018. Job Displacement and the Duration of Joblessness: The Role
of Spatial Mismatch. Review of Economics and Statistics 100:203–18.
Autor, David H. 2003. Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing. Journal of Labor Economics 21:1–42.
Bernard, Tara Siegel. 2012. Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests. New York
Times, January 20.
Braucher, Jean, Dov Cohen, and Robert M. Lawless. 2012. Race, Attorney Influence, and
Bankruptcy Chapter Choice. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 9:393–429.
City of Chicago. 2011. Mayor Rahm Emanuel: No More Free Rides. Press release, October 5. https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2011/
october_2011/fake.html.
———. 2018. Department of Finance. Payment Plan Options (Parking, Red Light Camera, and Automated Speed Camera). https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/fin/supp
_info/revenue/parking_and_red-lightticketpaymentplans.html.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 2014. Using Publicly Available Information to
Proxy Unidentified Race and Ethnicity: A Methodology and Assessment. Washington, DC: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
data-research/research-reports/using-publicly-available-information-to-proxy-for
-unidentified-race-and-ethnicity/.
Greene, Sara S., Parina Patel, and Katherine Porter. 2017. Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes. Minnesota Law Review 101:1031–98.
Gross, Tal, Matthew J. Notowidigdo, and Jialan Wang. 2014. Liquidity Constraints and
Consumer Bankruptcy: Evidence from Tax Rebates. Review of Economics and Statistics
96:431–43.
Kessler, Ryan E. 2020. Does Punishment Compel Payment? Driver’s License Suspensions
and Fine Delinquency. Working paper. Brown University, Department of Economics,
Providence, RI.

Race and Bankruptcy

295

Kiel, Paul. 2017. Caught in the Bankruptcy Feedback Loop. Atlantic, September 27.
Kneebone, Elizabeth, and Natalie Holmes. 2015. The Growing Distance between People and
Jobs in Metropolitan America. Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program report. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Lefgren, Lars, Frank L. McIntyre, and Michelle Miller. 2010. Chapter 7 or 13: Are Client
or Lawyer Interests Paramount? B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 10, art. 82,
pp. 1–44.
Li, Wenli, and Pierre-Daniel Sarte. 2006. U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choice: The Importance of General Equilibrium Effects. Journal of Monetary Economics 53:613–31.
Miller, Michelle M. 2015. Social Networks and Personal Bankruptcy. Journal of Empirical
Legal Studies 12:289–310.
Morrison, Edward R., and Antoine Uettwiller. 2017. Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 173:174–96.
O’Regan, Katherine M., and John M. Quigley. 1999. Accessibility and Economic Opportunity. Pp. 437–66 in Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in
Honor of John R. Meyer, edited by José Gómez-Ibáñez, William B. Tye, and Clifford
Winston. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Sanchez, Melissa, and Sandhya Kambhampati. 2018. How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black
Motorists into Bankruptcy. ProPublica Illinois, February 27. https://features.propublica
.org/driven-into-debt/chicago-ticket-debt-bankruptcy/.
Siegel, David M. 2013. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Helps Pay Off Parking Tickets. December
7. http://davidmsiegel.com/repay-parking-tickets-over-a-five-year-period-bankruptcy/.
Tzioumis, Konstantinos. 2018. Demographic Aspects of First Names. Scientific Data 5, art.
180025, pp. 1–9. https://www.nature.com/articles/sdata201825.
White, Michelle J., and Ning Zhu. 2010. Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.
Journal of Legal Studies 39:33–61.

